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THE METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF CAMPANELLA’S NOTION OF FICTION
Guido Giglioni
Summary
Campanella’s notion of  fiction (fabula) hinges upon a multilayered view of  reality 
based on a series of  ontological divisions : ens rationis divinae, ens reale, ens rationis, 
ens irrationalitatis and non ens. They identify levels of  being that span the full range 
of  reality, from a minimum to a maximum degree (an ontological spectrum that in 
Campanella’s philosophy is closely connected to the Telesian criterion of  self-preser-
vation). According to Campanella, any human foray into the territories of  ‘being of  
reason’, ‘being of  unreason’ and even ‘non being’ is always balanced by a natural ‘re-
turn’ to being and reality. This article intends to contextualise Campanella’s views on 
fiction within the broader framework of  his metaphysics.
1. The ontological components of Campanella’s notion 
of reality : real being (ens realis), primalities (primalitates), 
the archetypal world (mundus archetypus) 
and the universal sentience of nature (sensus rerum)
An inquiry into Campanella’s view concerning the elusive nature of  fic-tion should start with a discussion of  his notion of  reality, which he 
defines according to a series of  ontological divisions. The most general divi-
sion is the one between being (ens) and non-being (non ens) ; ens in turn is di-
vided into « real being » (ens realis), « being of  reason » (ens rationis) and « being 
of  unreason » (ens irrationalitatis). When Campanella refers to ens realis, he 
is not espousing a view of  reality in which being means an undifferentiated 
whole ; rather, he looks at reality as resulting from an articulate system of  
original differences, such that being is inherently power, knowledge and lo-
ve (a view that Campanella encapsulates in his theory of  the so-called ‘pri-
malities of  being’ : posse, nosse, velle). Every single res in nature is able to act, 
to know and to desire. Likewise, every essence is powerful, knowing and 
willing. Res are real, but their essentiae, located in what Campanella calls the 
« archetypal world », are even more real. The world of  ens realis is the world 
of  Thomas Aquinas. The world of  res is the world of  Telesio’s physicalism. 
The world of  archetypes, finally, is the world of  Plotinus’ Intellect. 1 A quo-
guido.giglioni@sas.ac.uk
1 On Campanella’s ontological views, see L. Blanchet, Campanella, Paris, Alcan, 1920 ; E. 
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tation from the Metaphysica may help shed more light on the principal divi-
sions of  being in Campanella’s system :
we call real being (ens reale) everything that we find as made by God or nature prior 
to the artificial operation of  human reason (ante rationis humanae operationem artifi-
ciosam). A being of  reason (ens rationis), on the other hand, is not reason or an op-
eration of  natural reason, but everything that, coming after the real being of  beings 
(post esse reale entium), is produced by human reason or art, having a purpose in mind, 
whether this is within reason (intra se), like names, words and syllogisms, or outside 
reason (extra se), like a garment, a house, a piece of  writing. All God’s works, and ev-
erything that is outside God, are beings of  divine reason or divine art (entia rationis 
seu artis divinae), but for us they are real beings (entia realia). Those beings that we 
make are called ‘of  reason’, that is, artificial, if  they are made for a certain use. If  they 
are made with no use in mind, like a paralogism, the tricks staged by mountebanks, 
then they are called beings of  unreason (entia irrationalitatis) or deception, regard-
less of  whether they are active – such as a heretical statement, a fable, a sophism and 
a military stratagem – or passive – like when one thinks that God is a body, or he is 
wasting his time, or he is deceived by an apparition (spectrum) – or whether beings of  
unreason are both active and passive, like when someone who is deceived deceives 
other people. 1
As already suggested, Campanella’s philosophical universe is characterised 
by various levels of  reality, from beings of  divine reason – i.e., the whole cre-
ated reality, also called ens reale, when it has not become part of  the world of  
human knowledge – to beings of  reason (i.e., the world of  human – inward 
and outward – knowledge and creation) and, finally, to the pure figments of  
the imagination that have no actual referent in the created being, figments 
which Campanella calls ‘beings of  unreason’. In the list above, God’s ideas 
are at the top, while fables are mentioned as an example of  ‘active’ being of  
unreason ; mere semblances and apparitions are at the bottom of  the onto-
logical scale, defined as ‘passive’ beings of  unreason. Elsewhere, Campan-
ella refers also to non-being, non ens, as a possible source of  creations. This is 
the domain of  the devil and demonic magic : « no art is based on falsehood, 
unless it is diabolical, for the devil is the father of  lies ». 2
Reality in the strict sense is therefore everything that is made (primarily) 
by God or (secondarily) by nature independently of  the artificial operations 
Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit, Berlin, Bru-
no Cassirer, 1922, i, pp. 240-257 ; ii, pp. 79-84 ; S. Femiano, La metafisica di Tommaso Campanella, 
Milan, Marzorati, 1968 ; G. Di Napoli, La metafisica di Tommaso Campanella, in Campanella e 
Vico, Padova, cedam, 1969, pp. 19-35 ; B. Bonansea, Tommaso Campanella : Renaissance Pioneer 
of  Modern Thought, Washington, Catholic University of  America Press, 1969 ; R. Amerio, Il 
sistema teologico di Tommaso Campanella, Milano-Napoli, Ricciardi, 1972 ; A. Isoldi Jacobelli, 
Tommaso Campanella : ‘Il diverso filosofar mio’, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1995 ; G. Ernst, Tommaso 
Campanella : The Book and The Body of  Nature, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010. 
1 Metaphysica, i, pp. 89b-90b. 2 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 350.
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of  human reason. In defining reality as a product of  « divine reason », Cam-
panella introduces an element of  conventionality and artificiality in the very 
roots of  natural beings. There are, however, two important elements that 
prevent Campanella’s metaphysics from drifting into the territories of  theo-
logical arbitrariness : the reference to original, exemplary patterns of  reality 
(mundus archetypus), upon which God modelled his creation of  nature, and 
the universal law of  self-preservation, which is the criterion that regulates 
all transformations among real beings and beings of  reason. In this sense, 
all aspects of  reality, both natural and artificial, are pervaded by a strong 
sense of  purpose and usefulness. Campanella sums up this point by saying 
that all things of  nature have the inner power to be because they know they 
exist, they want to exist and therefore they are constantly looking for ways 
and means to exist. 1 Potentia, sapientia and amor – Campanella’s ‘primalities’ 
– are so intimately intertwined with each other that the distinction which 
identifies one from the other is not real, but formal ; which means that be-
ing is one and is inherently power, knowledge and love, but we can have a 
glimpse of  its innermost structure by distinguishing its defining attributes 
through our mind. Primalities are not actual « beings » (entia) or essences, 
but « being-nesses of  being » (entitates entis or realitates entis). 2 Finally, to the 
real distinction between ens realis and ens rationis, and to the formal one 
between power, knowledge and will (the primalities), Campanella adds the 
Platonic distinction – a real distinction, in this case – between the archetyp-
al, ideal world and the ectypal, corporeal one :
Within the first Being we place the archetypal world, boundless, infinite, self-identi-
cal, which transcends the boundaries and the measures of  the corporeal world, being 
realer, truer and better than this one, and indeed in its being (entitas) it produces in-
numerable worlds endlessly, while surpassing them all in perfection. For God has the 
power to create innumerable worlds, as is demonstrated by Chrysostom, provided 
that these worlds are able to exist (si ipsi esse existentialiter possent). Therefore, those 
who imagine infinite corporeal worlds can imagine such worlds, because they are in 
fact (revera) in God. 3
Our imagination’s ability to devise infinite worlds is evidence that our mind 
is modelled upon God’s power to create countless worlds. In this sense, the 
imagination is not arbitrary ; indeed, it is the strongest evidence we have that 
we are made in God’s image. The archetypal world of  intelligible patterns 
of  being defines the legitimate meaning of  fictional representation (fabula). 
Reality in the strict sense is therefore an infinite reservoir of  ideal possibili-
ties, pregnant with meanings and virtual dispositions that are ready to be 
fulfilled every time the occasion presents itself. This is the primalitative and 
archetypal world, the most real world within Campanella’s metaphysics. 
1 Metaphysica, ii, p. 2a. 2 Ibid., p. 113a. 3 Ibid., p. 243a-b.
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This world transcends our individual souls and the corporeal worlds they 
inhabit. We, as any other finite res in nature, ‘occasion’ primalities, essences 
and ideas to be activated ; we cannot cause them. This means that, in the 
final analysis, we ‘feel’ (sentire) the world, we do not know it (where feeling, 
sentire, retains all the force of  Telesio’s notion of  sensus and has very little 
of  the eighteenth-century notion of  sensibility). We feel that something is 
happening, we see the occasions that prepare the emerging of  the ideal 
reality, but the underlying causes escape our mental grasp. As Campanella 
sums up this point, « it is evident that we know things in a partial way (ex 
parte), not as they are (non prout sunt), but as we are affected by them (ut af-
ficimur) ». Undoubtedly, this aspect of  Campanella’s metaphysics is the one 
that is more closely indebted to Telesio’s physicalism. 1 According to the 
principles of  Telesio’s sensism, we do not know things because they affect 
our senses in a direct and unmediated way, but because we know ourselves 
as being affected by things. To put it otherwise, everything in the corporeal 
world is perceived through sense.
2. The nature of poetic reality
Poetry, like any other thing in nature, emerges from the sentient power of  
things and contributes to the self-preservation of  the universe (conservatio). 
First and foremost, sense is touch. What cannot be touched is inferred. Lan-
guage and metaphors are ways of  ‘touching’ absent things. This point con-
firms Campanella’s belief  in the physical nature of  words. They are units 
of  breathed air sculpted by our mouth in such a way that they resemble as 
closely as possible the real things they represent. In the Metaphysica, Cam-
panella defines words as « signs of  the things we know (signa rerum scita- 
rum), which we utter so that we can signify to other people what we know ». 
Words are thus at once social and physical constructs :
The first human beings, gathering together, began to express the information received 
from the outside through external signs, which no doubt were similar to the things 
identified by external marks so that they could to be exhibited outwardly, as dumb 
people do now, especially through interjections ; finally, they imitated the things them-
selves with their mouth. They beat the breathed out air with their teeth, lips, palate, 
tongue and gums, and modulate it with the throat, until they represent the thing they 
want. In this way, for instance, from the sound tup, tup that the percussion of  wood 
makes in our ears, the Greeks said tuvptw’, from the cracking of  a whip, with which 
they flogged their slaves, the Latin said verbero, and now in Italian we say batto, which 
once was also said in Latin, imitating as it were the beating of  viscous material. 2
The human beings’ ability to shape the air with their mouths in order to 
create actual replicas of  things is in fact a direct effect of  the already men-
1 Ibid., i, p. 86a. 2 Ibid., p. 86a-b.
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tioned primordial tendency in the sentient spirit to be affected and to affect 
things (res).
As the spirit is affected by the things (patitur a rebus), in the same way, it imitates them 
and expresses these affections (passiones) with the mouth. However, since it is not af-
fected by everything by itself  (non ab omnibus per se patitur), it created the words, to the 
extent that they are capable of  expressing something of  those things by which it is af-
fected (afficitur), or by mingling things that are close or connected to each other. So it 
[the spirit] said lapidem, as if  ‘it injures the foot’ (quasi laedentem pedem), and virgultum, 
since ‘it turns upwards’ (quia vergit sursum). The fact is that the spirit cannot imitate 
the thing in its entirety through a word, but by indicating the most remarkable affect, 
operation or reality. 1
Like our perceptions of  reality, our words are not imitation of  things, but 
signs that describe our being affected by reality. Originally, the correspon-
dence between words and reality was closer and tighter, directly connected 
to specific events in nature, important social functions or memorable ac-
tions. 2 Gradually, as time passed by, the link between the two became in-
creasingly more tenuous and was replaced by arbitrary conventions meant 
to signify reality without relying on direct, natural likenesses. In a way, the 
‘sin’ of  replacing the ens realis with the imaginary constructions of  the ens 
rationis started at the very beginning of  human history, following the way 
human beings perceived reality and handled their languages. The chasm 
interposing between verba and res and the ensuing dematerialisation of  the 
very physicality of  words (understood as a blend of  physical air and physical 
sound imitating a physical reality) represent a form of  linguistic estrange-
ment that runs parallel to the process of  cognitive estrangement occurring 
every time we perceive reality. We do not perceive (and consequently know) 
things and the essences of  things ; rather, we know ourselves being affected 
by things and essences. And, in being affected – more or less violently – by 
things and essences, we tend to forget, in various degrees, ourselves and 
reality. Likewise, the link between words and things is not based on the es-
sence of  things, but on the way we feel and imitate things and essences. In 
the same way as our perceptions of  things are not replicas of  external ob-
jects or of  their essences, but indications of  the way we react to reality, so 
our words do not mirror reality, but the way we are affected by reality.
1 Ibid., p. 86b. On Campanella’s view concerning the relationship between voces and res, 
see G. Ernst, Immagini e figure del pensiero filosofico di Campanella, in this volume, pp. 75-80.
2 Metaphysica, i, p. 87a : « Romani et Hebraei rectius vocabula imponebant, quam nunc 
solemus, quoniam ab aliqua saltem proprietate, et officio, et eventu, et facinore : ut Fabius a 
serendis fabis : Lentulus a lentibus : Cincinnatus a cincinno : Beniamin a filio doloris parturi-
entis. At vocabula originalia, unde ista derivantur, priora sunt, nempe ab imitatione, quae ex 
literarum modulamine capi posset, ut cacare recte positum est, quia ca, ca, facit anus dum 
deponit superflua ».
guido giglioni36
No word derives from the essence of  a thing, but from the act through which the 
thing acts upon us. Hence unknown essences seem to be made known to us through 
characters, following, however, the way they affect us. Otherwise there should be as 
many characters as there are essences, as they report it happens among the Chinese. 
This would be excellent, if  the characters were drawn from the essences. However, 
this can only be done by God, who alone knows them. 1
Words cannot represent things as they are in reality (in re) because there is 
an infinite distance separating the entia rationis humanae (words) from the 
entia rationis divinae (things). God, in a way, is the ultimate poet : He made 
the essences, He made the things, He knows them, He utters them. Better 
still : He does all these things in one single act. Human beings, by contrast, 
know things indirectly, by knowing their own reactions to their internal and 
external reality. Sense perception, especially the sense of  touch, is the most 
direct grasp of  things (Telesio), and yet even sense perception is already 
a mediated representation of  reality : it is what we make of  reality when 
we are touched by things (metaphysically speaking, it is a process of  pri-
malitative re-enactment of  life and knowledge ‘on the occasion of ’ being 
touched). The other four external senses, the internal senses, namely, the 
imagination and memory, even reason (understood as the discursive fac-
ulty), are already more distant from the reality of  things that we ‘touch’. 
On an empirical and historical level, Campanella thinks that fiction, in all 
its various forms, originated as an attempt to fill the gaps that inevitably 
accompany our perception of  reality : fables derive from allegories, allego-
ries from metaphors, metaphors from resemblances among things. 2 As we 
have seen, metaphorical transfers occur constantly in our language, every 
time we realise that onomatopoeic imitations of  things are not sufficient to 
render the inexhaustible richness of  reality : « when we do not have the right 
word, or hearers do not like that particular word or cannot understand it, 
we borrow such a word from something similar ». 3 Likewise, on a larger 
scale, we devise fables to make up for a lack of  reality (la favola si fa per la 
mancanza del vero). 4
It seems, therefore, that the way Campanella describes the process of  per-
ception introduces an element of  arbitrariness and conventionality at the 
very core of  human knowledge. We are directly affected by reality, but our 
descriptions of  it are inevitably distorted and subjective. And yet, for all its 
limitations, human knowledge is anchored to the ens verum of  the primali-
1 Ibid., i, p. 87a.
2 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 1008 : « Inventionem fabulae arbitror ab allegoria ortam esse, alle-
goriam vero a metaphora, metaphoram a similitudine rerum ». 3 Ibid.
4 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 324. On Campanella’s view about the use of  fictional narratives 
in oratory, see Peter Mack’s essay in this volume, p. 27.
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ties of  being, and the same is true of  any true art and poetry. By and large, 
Campanella is firmly of  the opinion that there is no need to invent alterna-
tive realities when the actual, historical reality seems to be constantly burst-
ing with events and situations worthy of  being represented. As examples, 
he mentions the conflict that opposed Julius Caesar to Pompeo, or the geo-
graphical explorations led by Christopher Colombo, Walter Raleigh and 
Magellan. 1 Examining the characteristics of  philosophical poems, Campan-
ella points out that « invention consists in finding that which is or was, for 
there is no knowledge (scientia) of  things that do not exist (delle cose che non 
sono) ». 2 However, he is ready to admit that a poet deals not only with the 
world of  external reality (res), but also and especially with the « representa-
tion » of  such a reality, i.e., their « signs » (signa rerum), that is, stories (fabulae) 
and metaphors (metaphorae). 3 In this respect, Campanella is willing to admit 
that a certain kind of  compensatory mechanism is involved in the poetic 
representation of  reality. We create fables when full knowledge of  reality is 
not available (as already pointed out above, « la favola si fa per mancanza del 
vero »). 4 Aesthetic pleasure (voluptas) and beauty (pulchritudo) are not inher-
ent in things (non insunt rebus). It is the poet who adds a level of  idealisation 
(transfiguratio sermonis) to the poem, through which « he says something and 
means something else, and reveals obscure things through clear ones ». 5 In 
this sense, the truth of  fiction is symbolical : « the truth of  a fable does not lie 
in its being represented (figuratur) in its sense, but in referring to a different 
sense ». 6 Even stories that are unlikely – but unambiguously so – can be used 
as parables to represent moral and religious meanings. 7 However, Campan-
ella cautions against the religious use of  allegorical fictions, for Christianity 
has dramatically redefined the meanings of  past religions and mythologies 
through the dogma of  the incarnation.
Now that the truth about religious matters has been revealed by God himself  made 
human, we are not allowed any longer to tell stories (favoleggiare) about these subjects, 
but we should express ourselves according to the Catholic faith. 8
Unfortunately – Campanella continues in his analysis – the Greek (or better, 
the Aristotelian) notion of  imitation has prevailed in the history of  West-
ern literature and has marred the very meaning of  artistic representation. 
Admittedly, here Campanella is too severe and narrow with Aristotle’s no-
tion of  imitation. In his opinion, Aristotle meant by imitation an imaginary, 
1 Poetica, in Scritti lett., pp. 321-322. 2 Ibid., p. 350.
3 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 950. 4 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 325.
5 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 954 : « aliud dicit et aliud significat, et per clara obscura patefa-
cit ». 
6 Ibid., p. 1030 : « fabula enim est vera, quando non in suo sensu, sed alieno figuratur ».
7 Ibid., p. 1100. 8 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 325.
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fictitious recreation of  reality, what Campanella characterises as fabulosa 
imitatio. 1 He thinks that there are various kinds of  imitation, and Aristotle 
confined his notion of  imitation only to the « fantastic » one, which in fact, 
in Campanella’s opinion, is the kind of  imitation that is the most distant 
from the true nature of  poetry, so much so that poets who follow Aristotle’s 
canons of  mimetic representation are mere liars. 2 An example of  a modern 
poet who succumbed to the lure of  ‘Greek’ fiction is Tasso, who, unlike Ar-
iosto, derived all his stories from pagan traditions. 3
Campanella believes that fiction should be concerned with reality also 
with respect to the aesthetic response it causes in an audience. Describing 
the defining characteristics of  the heroic poems, Campanella insists that the 
story narrated be related to real events :
The main action should always be true, otherwise it moves little, for believable things 
do not produce emotions (non enim credibilia sunt affectuosa). Likewise, the main ac-
tion should provide any added fable with likelihood (similitudo), for, if  we know that 
the foundation is false, we do not believe anything any longer. 4
Campanella does not rule out the possibility that a poet may use a certain 
amount of  ‘un-reality’ in its creations. However, this does not mean for him 
that « we are going to sing impossible things ». Impossible deeds performed 
by human beings would overcome the audience’s ability to suspend their 
disbelief  (fides auditorum), whereas such extraordinary events are legitimate 
and plausible when they are caused by God. 5
Muslim clerics (papassi) imagine (fingunt) that Alì’s sword slaughtered twenty Chris-
tians all at once with one blow, and Ariosto imagines that the golden spear of  Argalia 
knocked down everyone it touched, for it had been hardened with a spell. 6
Campanella’s remarks on Ariosto’s poetry are particularly interesting. Giv-
en the philosophical premises of  Campanella’s system, it is not surprising 
that the scope of  Ariosto’s imagination is deemed to be too wide to be en-
tirely compatible with reality :
1 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 980. See also Poetica, p. 321. On the discussion on the limits of  ‘fan-
tastic’ imitation during the Renaissance, see G. Giglioni, The Matter of  the Imagination : The 
Renaissance Debate over Icastic and Fantastic Imitation, « Camenae », viii, 2010, pp. 1-21 (http ://
www.paris-sorbonne.fr/la-recherche/les-unites-de-recherche/mondes-anciens-et-medie-
vaux-ed1/rome-et-ses-renaissances-art-3625/revue-en-ligne-camenae/article/camenae-no-8-
decembre-2010). 2 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 968.
3 Ibid., p. 1102. See Poetica, p. 337. On Campanella’s poetics, see L. Bolzoni, « Al novo secolo 
lingua nova instrumento rinasca » : La ricerca campanelliana di una nuova lingua e di una nuova me-
trica, in Tommaso Campanella e l’attesa del secolo aureo, Florence, Olschki, 1998, pp. 61-88.
4 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 1098.
5 Ibid., p. 1038 : « Ubi autem non insunt res mirae, finguntur [...] Non tamen canemus im-
possibilia [...] Possunt haec diis et miraculose tribui, non autem hominibus iuxta fidem audi-
torum ».  6 Ibid.
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a good poet, especially an epic one, will brings into existence the whole world. From 
this point of  view, while he narrates Astolfo’s and Ruggero’s travels and mention the 
Oriental kings, Ariosto surpasses Virgil and Homer. One inconvenient is that he learnt 
from Boiardo to indulge too much in stories (fabulosissimus). 1
And yet, for all his flights of  the imagination, the fabulosissimus Ariosto is a 
better poet than Tasso. Ariosto, Campanella argues, « lived in the feminine 
century », and his creations reflect the reality of  his time, whereas Tasso pre-
ferred to rely slavishly on the fabulosa imitatio of  the Greeks. 2
3. The role of fiction between lack and excess of reality
To sum up what has been discussed so far, according to Campanella, works 
of  fiction (fabulae and parabolae) should imitate reality (imitatio verorum). In 
this sense, poetry at its highest and its best is an exemplary representation 
of  reality, and as such it is linked to the good of  the whole universe. When, 
for some reason, reality is too difficult, elusive, brutal, and when it remains 
invisible or cannot be represented, then the poet may resort to similarities 
(similitudines) and imitations (imitationes). However, inventions and fictions 
are not strictly necessary for works of  poetry ; they can be used when real, 
historical or scientific material is not available (ubi desunt exempla vera).
Our fictional representation of  reality can be of  two kinds : direct or sym-
bolical. In the first case, unlikely or impossible events should not be used ; in 
the second, unlikely and impossible events, precisely because of  their absurd 
nature, should be treated as signs of  realities that transcend the natural and 
ordinary meaning of  things. This is particularly evident in the case of  reli-
gious poetry : « Divine things can only be expressed through a comparison 
with human things, whether this is analogical, metaphorical or mixed ». 3 
Campanella’s notion of  fiction rests therefore on the precarious notion of  
‘surrogated’ reality. This means that fiction can sometimes be misused to 
replace, or to compensate for, or even to escape from reality, but also that 
it retains a close link with the uncontainable freedom of  the imagination, 
the freedom from the oppressive rule of  literal signification. A clearly and 
deliberately fictional account of  things refers, beyond the sign, to a meaning 
that is transcendently ‘other’.
It is therefore apparent how Campanella’s notion of  fiction brings to the 
fore all the characteristic aspects of  his metaphysics. Poetry is an instrument 
of  self-preservation and, in the great Campanellian scheme of  things, the 
highest form of  self-preservation on earth is the preservation of  the State, 
1 Ibid., p. 1040. 2 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 337.
 3 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 1070.
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which is closely related to the preservation of  religion. Regardless of  wheth-
er they are aware or not of  this end, poets reach the purpose of  promoting 
social and political stability by arousing feelings of  pleasure and wonder in 
their audience, irrespective of  whether the audience realises that it is part 
of  this learning experience. 1 They produce genuine wonder and pleasure 
when they represent reality, understood as both ens realis and ens rationis 
divinae, intersecting both corporeal (ectypal) and intelligible (archetypal) 
being. Only when the representation is based on reality does fiction (fabula) 
become believable (credibilis) and capable to affect an audience (affectuosa). 
In giving form to the ideas of  the archetypal world, poets produce exem-
plary imitations which, because of  their level of  universality, can be under-
stood by the greatest number of  people. It is through the process of  ‘exem-
plification’ that true poetry shows its direct link to the mundus exemplaris.
Apart from the different ontological levels that are being re-enacted each 
time by a poetic representation (whether the corporeal, the mental or the 
archetypal one, or one of  the primalitative functions of  power, knowledge 
and will), one should ask what ‘reality’ means for a human being. According 
to Telesio’s notion of  experience as ‘affectability’, reality is what human be-
ings perceive of  things. 2 And human beings perceive things by becoming, to 
a certain extent, these things. In other words, they know things by imitating 
them, and perception is ultimately imitation. More than any other being in 
nature, a poet is that creature which has the ability to turn its sentient and 
imagining spirit into the thing he perceives and imagines. Referring to Hor-
ace, Campanella explains that no poet can move (afficere) other people if  he 
himself  is not moved (affectus). 3 A poet has « a pure and shiny spirit, which 
easily transforms itself  into any thing », and this transformation occurs « by 
imitating the affect that expresses them ». 4 Most of  all, precisely because of  
the exemplary nature of  his representations of  things, he is able to make 
other people feel what he feels in the first place. The poet occasions the 
re-enactment of  the primalities of  being (power, knowledge and will), and 
through the poet, the audience, too, re-enacts the exemplary character of  
the situation that is being represented before their eyes or in their imagina-
tion :
When in Ariosto I read of  Orlando’s courage and generous deeds and about the mean 
actions of  the coward, I am moved as if  they were happening before my eyes, and 
often I cry. 5
1 Ibid., p. 1034.
2 On Telesio’s notion of  affectability, see G. Giglioni, The First of  the Moderns or the Last 
of  the Ancients ? Bernardino Telesio on Nature and Sentience, « Bruniana & Campanelliana », xvi, 
2010, pp. 69-87. 3 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 1032. Cfr. Horace, De arte poetica, 99-105.
4 Poetica, in Scritti lett., p. 342.
5 Poëtica, in Scritti lett., p. 946. On Campanella’s appreciation of  Ariosto’s ability to repre-
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The domain of  fiction (fabula), entirely pervaded by the three primalities of  
power, knowledge and will, occupies the sphere of  ens rationis, but it signifi-
cantly intersects with large sections of  the ens realis. In some cases, it also 
penetrates into the domain of  ens irrationalitatis, not to say non ens. How-
ever, it is only when it does not favour our tendency to escape from reality 
that fiction contributes to expanding our grasp of  the infinite potentialities 
of  the intelligible world. According to Campanella, we resort to fiction and 
the work of  imagination for two principal reasons : the first is to explore all 
that cannot be perceived through direct, ‘tactile’ perception ; the second is 
to smooth the harshest aspects of  reality and make them more tolerable. 
Nature devises the former reason to supplement a lack of  reality and the 
second to come to terms with an excess of  reality. In all these cases, fiction 
has a key role in the universal process of  self-preservation, a law that regu-
lates all aspects of  reality. Through fiction and poetry, we adapt to reality. In 
the first situation mentioned above (i.e., lack of  reality), we imagine things 
that we cannot experience directly (in a ‘tactile’ way, so to speak) and that 
can be plausibly connected to what we experience in a direct way (the level 
of  esse posse existentialiter mentioned earlier). In the second situation (i.e., 
excess of  reality, in the sense that reality is too complicated and difficult to 
be understood), we may be able to reach very abstract truths by produc-
ing representations that are accessible to the imagination. Such a process 
of  mitigating the asperities of  knowledge with the help of  the imagination 
is evident with prophets and their key role in establishing and maintaining 
political stability. Finally, in the third situation (i.e., excess of  reality, in the 
sense that reality is too violent), the response of  the imagination is not a 
proper adaptation to reality and an actual manifestation of  self-preserva-
tion. In this case, adaptation and self-preservation are only apparent, in that 
the figments of  the imagination lead the human mind astray in the regions 
of  non-being. The first two situations represent forms of  appropriate, legiti-
mate imitation ; the third is a kind of  deluded, compensatory and escapist 
imitation, good for tyrannising and tyrannised people. 1
sent virtues and affects, see ibid., p. 1040 : « Hac in re Ariostus est mirabilis, dum fidelitatis et 
magnanimitatis et eventus varii canit exempla in Orlando, in Zerbino, in Bradamante, etc. ». 
1 On Campanella’s belief  in the interplay of  tyranny and lack of  knowledge, see G. Ernst, 
Immagini e figure del pensiero filosofico di Campanella, in this volume, pp. 80-85.
